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http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/58RESEARCH Open AccessIncentives for new antibiotics: the Options Market
for Antibiotics (OMA) model
David M Brogan1,2 and Elias Mossialos2*Abstract
Background: Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat resulting from the convergence of biological, economic
and political pressures. Investment in research and development of new antimicrobials has suffered secondary to
these pressures, leading to an emerging crisis in antibiotic resistance.
Methods: Current policies to stimulate antibiotic development have proven inadequate to overcome market
failures. Therefore innovative ideas utilizing market forces are necessary to stimulate new investment efforts.
Employing the benefits of both the previously described Advanced Market Commitment and a refined Call Options
for Vaccines model, we describe herein a novel incentive mechanism, the Options Market for Antibiotics.
Results: This model applies the benefits of a financial call option to the investment in and purchase of new
antibiotics. The goal of this new model is to provide an effective mechanism for early investment and risk sharing
while maintaining a credible purchase commitment and incentives for companies to ultimately bring new
antibiotics to market.
Conclusions: We believe that the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) may help to overcome some of the
traditional market failures associated with the development of new antibiotics. Additional work must be done to
develop a more robust mathematical model to pave the way for practical implementation.
Keywords: Antimicrobial resistance, Antibiotic development, Options Market for Antibiotics, Incentive mechanisms
for new antibioticsBackground
It is well recognized that there is an impending global
crisis in novel antibiotic development. In a 2004 survey
of publicly disclosed new molecular entities by the
world’s 15 largest pharmaceutical manufacturers, only
1.6% were antibacterial agents [1]. The trend has only
worsened in recent years, with the former head of the
European Medicine’s Agency (EMA) Thomas Lonngren,
decrying in 2010, the existence of “a gap of 5 years with-
out research into new antibiotics” [2]. While dramatic,
this underscores the perceived underfunding of anti-
biotic research at a time when antibiotic resistant patho-
gens have become increasingly prevalent across the
globe. Attention has recently focused on the ESKAPE
pathogens – a collection of microbial organisms known
for their particular virulence and resistance to current* Correspondence: E.A.Mossialos@lse.ac.uk
2Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political
Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumantimicrobial regimens. The ESKAPE pathogens include:
Enterococcus faecium, Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella
pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumanni, Pseudomonas
aeruginosa, and Enterobacter species [3]. The burden of
these diseases disproportionately affects hospitalized
patients – it is estimated that annual hospital deaths in
the European Union alone from drug resistant versions
of the above pathogens top 25,000 patients, with costs
totaling more than EUR €900 million [4]. In the US, the
total annual cost of antibiotic resistance has been esti-
mated at US $26 billion [5], and the direct mortality
from antibiotic resistance infections has been reported
at 23,000 deaths annually [6].
As a class of drugs, antibiotics have several unique
properties which make them less profitable and there-
fore less attractive to corporate investment. To begin
with, many antibiotics are prescribed for a relatively
short course, anywhere from 3 days to 2 weeks, as
compared to a course of years or decades for anti-d Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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the decline is the fact that most effective antibiotics cur-
rently available are generics, with new medications often
having difficulty gaining ground or showing adequate cost-
effectiveness to justify a premium price [7]. Additionally,
consumption of antibiotics is intentionally kept low by
prescribers, for fear of breeding “super-bugs” – bacteria
resistant to multiple classes of antibiotics. However,
even with judicious prescribing of antibiotics, a cen-
tury’s worth of experience has demonstrated a constant
struggle to find new methods to combat bacteria, as
bacteria evolve new mechanisms to resist current drugs.
A high cost and significant technical effort is required
to find new antibiotics, particularly against Gram nega-
tive bacteria [8]. Additionally, after the technical chal-
lenges are overcome, clinical trials for antibiotics can be
costly and demanding as they require different trials for
each new indication in varying organ systems [8], resul-
ting in higher clinical costs than drugs in other thera-
peutic categories [9]. All of these factors combine to
produce an inherent tension between health policy and
industry research objectives. The market also fails spe-
cifically for antibiotics because the necessity for conti-
nual development of new antibiotics stems from the
impending future threat of resistance, not just the
current lack of efficacy. A critical market demand large
enough to spur development may not exist until a crisis
has emerged. The result, as shown in Figure 1, [10], is
that the total number of new molecular entities of anti-
bacterials approved annually has slowly declined over
the past two decades.
Prudent health policy seeks to encourage development
of additional antibiotic formulations and mechanisms,
even as financial pressures make this goal less attractiveFigure 1 Number of New Molecular Entities Approved by the
FDA per 5 year period through March 2011. Source: [10].
By permission of Oxford University Press/on behalf of the Infectious
Disease Society of America. Any reuse requires permission from
Oxford University Press.to industry. To combat this problem, a US government
Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance was
formed and subsequently developed an action plan in
2001 with four broad areas of focus: increased surveil-
lance; prevention and control, research and antimicro-
bial development. Lack of funding from the government
has led to underfunding of these mandates and subse-
quently little progress in any of the above areas [11]. In re-
sponse to this, the Infectious Disease Society of America
launched a public awareness campaign aimed at stimu-
lating public concern and promoting effective policy con-
cerning the growing trend of antibiotic resistance and
declining novel antibiotic development. However, persist-
ent inaction in passing appropriate federal legislation has
stymied significant progress in the war on anti-microbials
[11]. The STAAR Act (“Strategies to Address Antimicrobial
Resistance) was introduced into Congress with the aim to
build on previous efforts by the Interagency Task Force, but
this did not pass Congressional approval. More recent
efforts have come with the formation of the Transatlantic
Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) in 2009,
a collaboration between the European Union and the
United States focused on addressing the problem of an-
tibiotic resistance. TATFAR identified three key areas of
focus [12]:
1. Monitoring and encouraging appropriate use of
antibiotics in the medical and veterinary
communities
2. Prevention of drug resistant infections
3. Developing strategies to enhance the antibiotic
pipeline
In their 2011 report [12] detailing recommendations for
increased collaboration between the EU and US, the diffi-
culties of stimulating research across national borders is
recognized. However, the TATFAR report strongly urges
consideration of new mechanisms to incentivize research to
stoke the antibiotic pipeline. One such piece of legislation
designed to address these shortcomings is the Generating
Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act, passed in 2011.
Under the GAIN Act, qualifying antibiotics will receive pri-
ority review from the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), as well as an additional five years of market exclu-
sivity. Also, the legislation mandates a review of regulatory
requirements for clinical trial data, to take into account the
limited number of patients available for enrollment in the
case of more rare pathogens [5,13].
The passage of the GAIN Act reflects a growing public
awareness of the deepening crisis in antibiotic resistance
and lack of innovation, as demonstrated in a flurry of re-
cent news reports [14,15]. The Chief Medical Officer of
England has famously compared the risk of antibiotic re-
sistance to that of terrorism, as a significant threat to
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renewable resource has even been proposed to stimulate a
shift in public perception regarding the overuse of antibi-
otics in self-limiting infections [17]. If this paradigm shift
were to be successful, it may help reduce the prevalence of
antibiotic resistance, but with the added effect of decreas-
ing market demand for antibiotics, creating a further dis-
incentive for investment in research. More recently, the
WHO’s Consultative Expert Working Group examined
various policies and incentives to promote antibiotic de-
velopment. They concluded that free market competition
is the best mechanism to achieve affordable new products,
but this should be accompanied by a delinking of R&D
costs and drug price [18].
This conclusion highlights the most vexing aspect of
the antibiotic development shortage: how to simultan-
eously stimulate research and pay for R&D costs while
ensuring affordability. Traditionally, incentives to en-
courage research for neglected drugs have fallen into
two main types – push and pull methods- each with its
own shortcomings [19]. Push mechanisms focus on
moving the supply curve by decreasing the cost and bur-
den of risk to the developer. This is accomplished with
direct funding from grant making bodies, tax breaks and
patent pools [20]. Unfortunately, while these mecha-
nisms facilitate research on the front end, they have no
inherent ability to further reward successful completion
of a drug development project, potentially misaligning
the incentives of the developers and the funders.
Pull mechanisms focus instead on moving the demand
curve by increasing the incentives or revenues for suc-
cessful development of a final drug or vaccine. Examples
of this include the establishment of prizes or market
guarantees for neglected vaccines or drugs. These focus
on rewarding successful output, instead of subsidizing
the initial development; however, the challenge with
these mechanisms is in establishing an appropriate level
of incentive (or market price) such that it spurs in-
creased interest in development without being exces-
sively wasteful [21]. Another challenge unique to pull
mechanisms is to sufficiently specify the characteristics
of a drug or vaccine that will qualify for the final award
– too specific and it might deter developers, too broad
and the goals of the funder may not be realized.
The size of the incentives needed are not small. Esti-
mates of drug development capitalized costs range from
$800 million to over $2 billion, depending on the class
of pharmaceutical. Therefore, any mechanism to stimu-
late R&D must be backed by adequate funding [22-26].
Any push mechanism will require upfront investment,
thus all investments will have the same opportunity cost
of capital per dollar, depending on the timing of the in-
vestment. This is expected to be more efficient since
smaller sums are needed earlier on, thus very earlyinvestments are smaller, and therefore comparatively less
money is lost in foregone interest.
Development may also be incentivized by front loading
contracts, with larger payouts to companies to develop
the first drug in a particular class. This spurs initial,
rapid development, but does not guarantee long term
production. Instead, an appropriate commitment should
balance initial incentives with long term supply needs,
and encourage subsequent improvement in drug design
or supply [25]. Similarly, an effective network must be
built to ensure appropriate distribution of drugs to the
intended recipients, thereby guaranteeing the demand
vital to an appropriate return on investment by the com-
pany. This is particularly true if only a price is guaran-
teed, and not a specified flat payment. A specified prize
for successful development of a particular entity gives a
strong incentive for development, but runs the risk of
purchasers paying for drugs they may not be able to
practically deliver. An ideal solution would both guaran-
tee a price, and ensure a sufficient demand.
Methods
The combination of guaranteeing price, while ensuring
demand is not easily achievable with traditional research
incentive schemes. Therefore it was hypothesized that a
combination of various incentives might prove more ef-
fective in accomplishing this. Recent research from the
field of neglected vaccine development provides two
promising and novel mechanisms to stimulate R&D,
both of which hold lessons for the field of antibiotic de-
velopment. The first of these mechanisms is the idea of
an Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) for vaccines
[27], while the second is the Call Options for Vaccines
(COV) method [28].
The Center for Global Development (CGD) advocated
the idea of an advanced market commitment (AMC),
funded by international philanthropic agencies or NGO’s
[27]. The approach by the CGD guarantees a certain
price, subsidized by sponsors of the advanced market
commitment, for a specified number of units of a quali-
fying vaccine. The decision to purchase a newly devel-
oped vaccine is undertaken by individual countries or
purchasers, who contribute a small copayment, with the
difference between the guaranteed price and the copay-
ment made up by the AMC sponsors. This commitment
holds for a set number of vaccines, the number of which
is determined by the initial guaranteed price, such that
the entire market commitment of the sponsor is US $3
billion. For instance, an international sponsor may com-
mit to a market price of US $15 per dose for a malaria
vaccine. A developing nation might be able to pay US $1
per dose, with the balance made up by the sponsor of
the AMC. The first 200 million units will be guaranteed
to fetch such an artificially high price, with any
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purchasers. While the price is guaranteed for any vac-
cine, the quantity is not, as countries are not obligated
to purchase developed vaccines. This price (but not
quantity) guarantee removes the need to explicitly spe-
cify the conditions of an acceptable vaccine, but still
maintains a credible commitment to purchase. This
mechanism underscores the implicit assumption that the
key to successful development is to translate social bene-
fits into corporate profits.
With this in mind, it is important to understand some
of the tools utilized by corporations to evaluate profit-
ability of projects. One of these is the concept of net
present value (NPV). The net present value is the
current total of all expected cash flows for the life of a
project minus the costs [29]. In an extremely simplified
example, the NPV is the difference between an invest-
ment made at time 0 and the subsequent cash received
discounted by a set rate (usually the interest rate). Vari-
ants of this method can be utilized by companies to de-
termine whether or not a project is worth investing in
[30]. If the NPV is greater than 0, after adjusting for all
of the projected costs and returns, a project would be
considered favorable for investment. It is thus intuitive
that the ultimate decision to invest in a project can be
altered in one of two ways – decrease the costs or in-
crease the cash flow. To apply this to the previous dis-
cussion, pull mechanisms help to increase cash flow,
while push mechanisms lower costs.
A caveat to the task of increasing cash flow is the un-
certainty of future returns that is intrinsic to the re-
search and development process. Thus, expected cash
flows are often modeled in part based on the likelihood
of payout. A simple binomial model can be used to
understand the associated costs of success or failure in a
single stage of development on ultimate cash payout, and
subsequently NPV. Figure 2 gives an example of such a
project with a cost of US$5,000 and two possible out-
comes – success or failure, each with a pre-determined
payout. If the project is successful, the payout is US$5,000,Figure 2 Example of a project with a cost of $5,000 and two
possible outcomes – success or failure, each with differing
payouts. Source: [28].and if it fails the payout is US$0. Each of these states has a
pre-determined probability of success, and the total valu-
ation for the project is the sum of the products of each
payout and their probabilities. In the example in Figure 2,
a payout of US$5,000 would not be sufficient to induce
any rational actor to undertake the project. Instead, the
project can be made more attractive by increasing the
higher payout or lowering the initial cost. This is a funda-
mental and important principle - NPV can be adjusted by
altering future payouts or lowering costs (in this case by
initial payments). Potential for savings exists if a payer is
willing to shoulder some of the risks. The Call Options for
Vaccines (COV) model, explained below, is based on this
simple premise.
The COV model has been described previously [28].
However, it is worth briefly reviewing the principles of
this model to inform future discussion. The COV model
proposes an incentive mechanism combining both push
and pull methods, based loosely on the principles of call
options in equity markets. In a typical call option, an in-
vestor can purchase the right to buy a share of stock at a
later date for a fixed price. The idea behind an option is
that an investor can pay a premium now for the poten-
tial to profit later. However, the ability to profit later is
not guaranteed, thus risk is involved in the payment of
the premium. The seller of the call option also under-
takes some risk, since any potential profit will come at
the seller’s expense. For example, an option might be
bought on a share of Stock X (which currently trades at
US$10 per share) for US$1, with a strike price of US$15.
If the stock price moves above US$15 per share prior to
the option expiration date, the holder of the option may
then purchase one share of Stock X for US$15. There-
fore, three scenarios are possible:
1) The share price stays below US$15, the option is not
exercised and the purchaser loses a total of US$1;
2) The share price moves to $16 at which point the
option may be exercised, and a share is bought for
US$15, and sold immediately for US$16. In this
case, the holder of the option yields a net of US$0
(given the initial outlay of US$1). If the stock price
is between US$15 and US$16 the option may be
exercised, but the holder will lose money, up to a
net loss of US$1;
3) The share price goes above US$16, at which point the
option is exercised, the holder purchases a share of
stock at US$15 and sells it immediately at the current
higher market price – this results in a profit equal to
the difference between the current stock price and US
$16, (strike price plus initial option cost).
The COV model functions along similar lines. Instead
of buying the right to purchase a stock at a future date,
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of pharmaceuticals at a date in the future. This can be
done at virtually any stage of development, with higher
option prices at later stages (given the lack of uncer-
tainty). In no way is the purchaser guaranteed that the
drug will ever make it to market, but if it does, the pur-
chaser will be able to obtain a fixed quantity of it for a
discounted price. The purchaser is not exposed to the
risks and potential costs of any further development,
and companies are potentially given money at crucial,
earlier stages in the development process.
Results and discussion
The principles underpinning the COV model can be
adapted to the problem of stimulating antibiotic devel-
opment, with a few important changes, resulting in what
we have named the Options Market for Antibiotics
(OMA) model. To illustrate the purchase of an antibiotic
using the OMA model we will utilize an example that
closely follows the one above.
In this hypothetical scenario a large pharmaceutical
company may begin development of an antibiotic that
holds great promise in treating a disease whose major
burden is felt in developing nations. Examples of dis-
eases that may disproportionately affect developing na-
tions are typhoid and cholera [31]. Traditional market
forces would not make marketing or testing of this anti-
biotic profitable, since the purchasing power of the con-
sumers or patients in the developing nation may be
relatively low. A third party interested in combating this
bacteria in that nation or others may seek to stimulate
development of effective antibiotics. In our options
model, the third party payer, an NGO or government
agency, could purchase options for the antibiotic, which
they would redeem if and when the drug ever made it to
market. If they purchased the options early in develop-
ment, the price of the options would be low, but the risk
of the drug failing may be comparatively high. If the
option was purchased near the end of the product deve-
lopment cycle, its cost would be much higher. The pur-
chaser of the option would benefit in two ways: first, by
incentivizing development of a drug that they desire,
and second, by receiving the drug at a discounted price
compared to the market cost at the time of product
launch. The price of the initial option may be a few
pennies per dose desired (depending on the stage at
which it is purchased), but the holder of the option may
then receive a discount of several dollars off the ultimate
purchase price. If the initial cost of the option was $0.20
per dose desired, and 1 million doses were anticipated,
the third party payer may spend $200,000 up front.
However, if the antibiotic ultimately passes all regulatory
tests and becomes available on the market, the holder of
the options may then be able to purchase it at a discountof $2 per dose (this is an arbitrary amount as the actual
discount would vary based on the drug’s market cost
and options cost). For the 1 million doses desired, the
savings would be $1.8 million ($2 million discounted
total price minus the $200,000 upfront cost of the op-
tion). Of course, a strict accounting of the savings would
include an analysis of the interest lost during the devel-
opment process, as well as the relative risk assumed by
the purchaser. The third party could then utilize the
purchased antibiotics for their own purposes, or sell the
options or antibiotics to patients or health ministries for
a profit. If the antibiotic never makes it to market, then
the third party purchaser would lose the initial $200,000
investment.
Similarly, a “super fund” with the goal of stimulating
antibiotic development in a community of developed na-
tions, such as the EU, could purchase a similar set of op-
tions based on the perceived burden of disease. The
overriding purpose of any such “super fund” would be to
set priorities for funding and provide the infrastructure
for appropriate evaluation of potential investments.
Upon final approval of the antibiotic, this super fund
could then distribute the options to buy the drug to con-
stituent states, based on either need or contribution to
the fund. If desired, this distribution of call options
could be based on Ramsey pricing [32,33], such that
poorer EU countries would pay comparatively less than
richer EU countries. The strike price of the option would
remain consistent, but the presence of the options allows
for a secondary market to achieve equity based on soci-
etal or national values. This could be employed to assist
distribution in the least developed countries. If an NGO
were to purchase call options for these countries, they
could effectively distribute the options to the countries
at the time of market approval. As will be discussed
below, the strike price will be set at marginal cost of
production, therefore allowing those countries to pur-
chase the drug at a minimum cost, with the cost of the
effective subsidy borne by the NGO.
As with any investment decision, the efficacy of the
OMA model hinges on balancing the risks and rewards
of investment. This risk varies with the stage of the
investment, and the rewards vary with the cost of the
option, the market price of the final drug and the strike
price (the cost of the drug to option holders). The dif-
ference between the final drug price and the strike price
represents the value of the option to the holder at the
time of redemption, and the net profit is this value
minus the initial cost of the option. Mathematical mo-
dels exist for pricing options in the world of finance;
however, these rely on historical data about the volatility
of the stock price. This is likely not to be applicable to
our options model, which relies more on the decision by
the company to continue development or abandon the
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binomial options pricing model may more accurately
characterize this investment decision.
The Binomial Option Pricing Model [34] may be utilized
by firms to assess whether or not to engage in research
projects, based on a value maximization approach. Full
details of this model can be found in Additional file 1.
Briefly though, implementation of the model relies on four
main variables, the value of the Call option (C), the strike
price of the option (X), the initial investment required (I)
and the payoff owed by the purchaser to the company for
successful development, M. M would be a function of the
premium placed on development of a particular drug,
determined by the societal need for it. The CGD concept
of the Advanced Market Commitment could play an inte-
gral role in determining the socially acceptable payout for
development of a new drug. The OMA model is obtained
by integrating the Advanced Market Commitment into
the original COV model, through the use of a new vari-
able, AMC, which represents the determined value of the
market needed to stimulate research. In the CGD model,
$3 billion was the AMC amount needed to incentivize de-
velopment of vaccines. Along those same lines, it could
also be set at EURO 1.25 billion, a figure arrived at by
Towse and Sharma [35]. Ultimately the AMC amount will
evolve over time depending on the regulatory and R&D
costs associated with average drug development. The rela-
tionship of the determined market value for a specific drug
and the individual drug’s possible project payout is given
in the following equation:
M ¼ AMC  Q
N  E
Here we introduce three new variables, Q, N and E. Q
accounts for the novelty of a drug in comparison to
current alternatives, and will range in value from 0 to 1.
Obviously 1 is an ideal, assigned only to a completely
novel drug, addressing an as yet unmet need with superb
efficacy. The value of Q could be determined by an inde-
pendent advisory panel which would assess the likelihood
of the candidate drug to contribute novel therapeutic
benefit. Drugs with questionable efficacy would be scored
with a lower Q, meaning that their intrinsic project payoff
would also be lower. Similarly, N represents the total
number of all drugs currently available in the same class.
This would function to encourage development of drugs
in novel therapeutic classes, as opposed to finding isomers
and creating Me-Too drugs to gain marginal market share.
Finally E represents the average efficacy of all current
drugs in the same class, and can range from 0 to 1. There-
fore, with these parameters, a truly unique drug with high
likelihood of efficacy would yield a prize of the full ad-
vanced market commitment. A drug with little provenefficacy, entering into an already crowded field would have
a much smaller market value (M), and thus less likelihood
of securing a favorable return for the potential costs of
development. Drugs that enter into a field marked by inef-
fective competitors would also fare well. This mechanism
actively encourages novel drug development in neglected
areas and targets financial rewards to that innovation.
Finally, the strike price (or exercise price), X, must be
defined. In traditional financial call options, this price
determines whether or not the option will be redeemed,
since the redemption condition is whether or not the
stock price reaches the strike price. However, in our
model, the condition of redemption is approval of the
drug (i.e. successful development). Thus, we have chosen
to set the strike price as the marginal cost of production.
In this way, the manufacturer of the drug does not lose
money for each additional unit sold to holders of the call
option; however, the cost of development should not be
borne at later stages by holders of the call option (they
have invested previously to support development by pur-
chasing the call option).
Accurate information regarding the probability of suc-
cess at each stage in a product’s life cycle is key for fair
valuation utilizing the OMA model. DiMasi has reported
the probabilities of different classes of drugs successfully
transitioning from one phase of clinical trials to the next
over an 11 year period (Table 1). The overall estimated
success rate for anti-infectives ranged from 15.6% to a
maximum of 27% [36]. Anti-infectives have a lower rate
of initial success transitioning from Phase I to Phase II,
but a higher rate of transitioning from Phase III to regu-
latory review. This brings to bear an important point,
the challenge of developing antibiotics is both technical
and financial. Fewer drugs are being brought to market- in
the face of such high approval in the later stages, one can
only surmise that this is due to lack of initial investment,
as well as scientific challenges to investigation and discov-
ery of antibiotics and not end stage regulatory hurdles.
Determining when to invest
One of the benefits of the OMA model is that it allows
potential investors to adjust their exposure to risk based
on the phase of development in which they choose to in-
vest. Greater savings may be had by investing early, but
this will accompanied by substantial risk (Figure 3A).
However, the low cost may allow a purchaser to effect-
ively seed a number of projects for a relatively small
amount of money, thereby mitigating some of the risks.
Later phase investments will be relatively safer as the
antibiotic nears completion of all regulatory hurdles, but
the savings will be subsequently minimal In fact, if the
call option is fairly priced, as it enters the final phase of
testing it will reflect nearly the market cost of the soon
to be approved drug (Figure 3B). This highlights the
Table 1 Transitional Probabilities per Development Phase from 1993–2004
Therapeutic class Phase I-II (%) Phase II-III (%) Phase III- RR (%) RR-approval (%) Clinical approval success rate (%)
Anitneoplastic/immunologic 71.8 49.0 55.3 100 19.4
Cardiovascular 62.9 32.4 64.3 66.7 8.7
CNS 59.6 33.0 46.4 90.0 8.2
GI/metabolism 67.5 34.9 50.0 80.0 9.4
Musculoskeletal 72.4 35.2 80.0 100 20.4
Respiratory 72.5 20.0 85.7 80.0 9.9
Systemic anti-infective 58.2 52.2 78.6 100 23.9
Miscellaneous 62.8 48.7 69.8 91.3 19.5
Notes: Through to June 2009.
CNS, Central Nervous System; GI, gastrointestinal; RR, regulatory review.
Source: [36] DiMasi, J.A., et al., Trends in Risks Associated With New Drug Development: Success Rates for Investigational Drugs. Clin Pharmacol Ther,
2010. 87(3):272–277.
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chasers with different interests. Realistically, most parties
will invest in a stage somewhere between the two
highlighted above.
It should be noted that this mechanism may prove most
useful for small and medium size enterprises, which may
have a comparatively high cost of capital, as opposed to well
capitalized large pharmaceutical firms. It could also act as a
salvage mechanism to rescue promising compounds which
were abandoned due to lack of financial incentives. TheSequencing to lead Lead to Development 
Candidate (DC)
DC to Phase I
Phase II to P
NGO buys call 
option for specified 
price (C)
Sequencing to lead Lead to Development 
Candidate (DC)
DC to Phase I
Phase I to P
A
B
Figure 3 Timeline of drug approval with corresponding examples of c
cost of the call option is low, but the risk is high. B: Investment in late stageintellectual property of these salvage compounds could be
purchased by firms, and made profitable by infusion of
funds via the OMA model.
The impact of push mechanisms or investment at early
stage cannot be overstated. Spellberg et al. [37] recently de-
monstrated that an early stage push incentive may be 95%
smaller than an equally effective pull mechanism, simply due
to the effects of time discounting. In essence, timing matters
in R&D and judiciously applied incentives at appropriate
time intervals may have big effects on stimulating research.If Abx makes it to market, 
company purchases for strike
price (MC of production)
Phase II to Phase III File to launch
hase II Phase III tofile
Company purchases Abx for
Strike Price
Phase II to Phase III File to launch
hase II Phase III tofile
NGO buys call 
option for 
higher price
all options pricing. A: Investment in early stage of development, the
of development, the cost of the call option is high, but the risk is low.
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The OMA model depends crucially on the free ex-
change of information between potential purchasers
and developers. Access to all results from animal test-
ing and preliminary clinical trials would be essential to
allow proper evaluation of the viability and efficacy of
the drug. This sort of evaluation would require a
multi-disciplinary team with representatives suited to
evaluate the medical efficacy, pharmacologic profile
and cost effectiveness of purchasing options. Corpora-
tions may prove hesitant to disclose such sensitive
data, but appropriate steps could be taken to ensure
confidentiality.
Of course attention to intellectual property (IP) con-
cerns should always be considered when developing a
new incentive strategy. The European Institute for In-
novative Medicines, a public-private partnership to pro-
mote collaboration between industry and academics to
aid the drug development process [38], provides a cau-
tionary tale on the impact of IP concerns in stimulating
or prohibiting collaboration. Since its inception in 2007,
the initiative has been plagued by concerns over owner-
ship of IP, particularly from academic groups. The most
recent projects focus on enabling the development of
new antibiotics by creating a pan-European clinical trial
network and exploring methods to fight multi-drug re-
sistant pathogens through a combined EUR €224 million
grant. Despite this ambitious effort, concerns over IP
sharing still remain [39], however, necessary efforts are
being made to promote greater transparency in clinical
trial data stemming from this partnership [40].
In our proposal, if new IP is developed during a pro-
ject in which options are purchased, it would be pa-
ramount that a portion of any subsequent dividends
stemming from that IP be shared with the holders of the
initial options. This would be crucial to prevent com-
panies from ending projects in late stages of develop-
ment to avoid redemption of call options, and then
utilizing that same intellectual property to develop simi-
lar drugs where no options have been purchased.
It is possible that promising drugs might be conceived
by companies ill-equipped to carry their development
through. This must be taken into account when making
the decision to invest - thus the need for a multi-
disciplinary group to evaluate potential projects. It
would rely heavily on full disclosure of all relevant docu-
ments. International purchasers would need to hire
people with specific skills in financing, project valuation
and/or real options valuation (ROV) assessment. How-
ever, it is reasonable to believe that if information is
shared appropriately, the skills of the purchasers could
closely match those of the drug developers in this area.
While risk remains to purchasers, this risk is balanced
by the high priority of stimulating research in this area.This model is not without risk to the developer as
well, as additional hidden costs may manifest at the time
of final regulatory approval, possibly in the form of
additional clinical trials or testing. This risk could be
modeled and priced into the call option, or additional
contingency funds could be set aside, potentially paid for
by the purchaser. If difficult barriers to marketing ap-
proval remain, alliances could be formed between firms
with complementary capabilities to enhance their overall
competitive advantage. This would increase the chance
of the drug making it through the final stages of regul-
atory approval as alliances have been previously shown
to be more effective in drug development than single
institutions [41].
A valid critique of the model is that the premium price
of any antibiotic outside of the discounted price may be
substantial, but we believe this would only encourage
purchasers to participate in this scheme for future devel-
opments. Summation of the prices for the discounted
and non-discounted drugs could still result in an overall
global savings, but even if the overall costs are even, the
plan still has merit in its ability to encourage innovation
by providing early seed money. On the flip side, one can
imagine professional antibiotic investors who purchase
the options rights then sell to NGO’s for a profit. If in
the end the cost savings are minimal, but innovation is
accomplished we would consider this successful. Real
options modeling is a well established field that helps
pharmaceutical companies make development decisions,
we are trying to harness this modeling to aid in develop-
ment by combining both initial incentives for develop-
ment while still stimulating delivery of a final product.
The idea is to create a sophisticated risk sharing model
between all stakeholders.
Conclusions
It is clear that innovation in technical development as well
as regulatory and policy schemes are crucial to ensure a
full pipeline of effective antibiotics. The current market
pressures, combined with unique properties intrinsic to
the method of use of antibiotics, conspire to create many
imperfections that prevent aggressive investment. Never-
theless, the attention given to the lack of new antibiotic
development in the lay and scientific press has stimulated
some momentum in addressing this problem. The launch
of the IMI projects in the European Union coincides with
the passage of the GAIN Act in the US. These efforts are
designed to lower the cost and regulatory requirements
for antibiotic development. Another innovative financing
project is the Health Impact Fund (HIF), designed to
incentivize neglected drug development. The HIF seeks to
establish a global fund which will register new medicines
designed for neglected diseases and reward companies ac-
cording to the global burden of disease that each drug
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change for the reward payments during the first 10 years
of marketing, will then manufacture and distribute the
drug at cost during this time period. At the end of the first
decade, the companies must agree to allow generic manu-
facturing of the drug [42]. This certainly poses a number
of practical challenges, not the least of which is assessing
the health impact of each drug.
Despite these technical challenges, it is clear that a hy-
brid of push and pull mechanisms will be necessary to
effectively stimulate research in this field [43]. Many
such proposals have been put forth, and we add to this
the Options Market for Antibiotics. The distinguishing
feature of this scheme is that it seeks to incentivize de-
velopment early on, while sharing risks between devel-
opers and payers. The goal of the OMA is to allow the
market to function effectively at different points in a
drug’s life cycle, instead of simply at the time of market-
ing. The OMA model effectively takes the subsidy pro-
posed by the AMC, and transfers that to companies at
earlier stages, appropriately discounting it for the time
value of money, as well as the risk assumed. The under-
lying tenets of the need for a subsidy are the same; how-
ever, this hybrid mechanism simply advocates this
subsidy at different stages in the product life cycle.
As pharmaceutical companies continue to search for
blockbuster drugs to be sold at a premium price, attention
must be paid to the continued research and development
of vital but less profitable antibiotics, vaccines and other
neglected pharmaceuticals. Much work has been focused
on this in the past with mixed success. Now, as newer
models to stimulate R&D are developed, a more critical
examination of the risks and benefits must ensue.
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